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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL;
STEMMING THE TIDE OF NO PROMO HOMO
LAWS IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
By: Madelyn Rodriguez1

“When someone with the authority of a teacher, say,
describes the world and you are not in it, there is a
moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked
into a mirror and saw nothing.”2

I.

Introduction

The average primary school student spends
the majority of his or her waking hours in school.3
The school experience plays a monumental role in
determining a child’s worldview.4 It is no surprise,
then, that the issue of what to teach in schools is
a perennial conflict, especially when it relates to
homosexuality.5 Several states and many more local
governments have implemented policies prohibiting
any instruction given to students that could be
interpreted as portraying homosexuality in a positive
light.6 These policies, often referred to as “No Promo
Homo” policies, have been accused of contributing
to what is an already toxic environment for many
students.7 To illustrate the possible effects of these
laws, consider the following hypothetical :
John is a middle school student in
Arizona. He has two gay dads. John’s
science teacher, Ms. Smith, spends a
class teaching the required Arizona
sex education and AIDS curriculum.
In order to comply with the law she
is required to promote abstinence and
dispel myths about the transmission
of HIV. Further, she is not permitted
to promote the homosexual life-style,
promote homosexuality as a positive
alternative or suggest that some methods of homosexual sex are safe. During
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the class, some students begin to taunt
John because of his two gay dads.
The other students ridicule John with
taunts that he is gay too and his dads
surely must have AIDS. Ms. Smith has
never received any training on how to
teach these subjects or how to handle
students bullying other students. She
is unsure of whether to step in and
stop the taunts because she is afraid
anything she says to defend John and
his family could be construed as a promotion of homosexuality. As a result,
she ignores the taunts and continues
her lesson. After class, Ms. Smith sees
students still ridiculing and harassing
John in the hallways. She looks on, but
does not step in to stop it, still unsure
of what doing so would mean for her
employment. This is not the first time
John has been subjected to harassment
at school, but John does not report it
because he does not believe anything
will be done.
The above hypothetical illustrates some of
the questions raised by state and local laws prohibiting
the promotion of homosexuality. Teachers are left
to ask what they are and are not permitted to do.
Specifically, they are left to determine whether
interceding and stopping anti-gay bullying might
be construed as promoting homosexuality as an
acceptable alternative. Is a teacher like Ms. Smith even
permitted to tell students that having two parents of
the same gender is not something to harass someone
for, or could this too be considered promoting
homosexuality?
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The issue of maintaining an open and safe
environment for all children in school should be of
serious concern to parents, educators, society, and
the law.8 Given that teachers will inevitably leave
an immeasurable impression on the values, morals,
and opinions of the children whom they teach, the
question becomes one of which values should be
taught.9 By and large, there have been two separate
views in the debate over student instruction.10 The
traditional view believes that the school is tasked
with inculcating students with a prescribed set of
norms and values, usually the status quo.11 The
more liberal view believes that schools should act as
a sort of “marketplace of ideas.”12 This view tends
to eschew the inculcation of traditional values and
instead seeks to allow each teacher the freedom to
introduce differing perspectives and allow for debate
within the classroom.13 Logically then, it is clear that
the traditional view endorses more limitations on
teachers and other school officials, while the modern,
liberal view tends to endorse the right of the teachers
to present differing perspectives.14
Generally the courts, while recognizing the
need for the free exchange of ideas, have found that
the political body should be given the authority to
decide what values should be taught and which should
not.15 While this is a reasonable view, a problem
arises when the government, through its schools,
is permitted to dictate a set of “right” and “wrong”
values.16 The imposition of a set system of beliefs and
values prescribed by government officials from above
is naturally susceptible to abuse.17 This article will
argue that the imposition of No Promo Homo laws
in schools violates the Equal Protection Clause and
further encourages the bullying and harassment of
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”)18
students, resulting in even more egregious violations
of the Equal Protection Clause. Part II explores
the origins and implications of No Promo Homo
laws.19 Part III then provides an overview of select
No Promo Homo Laws.20 Part IV outlines current
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution and argues that No
Promo Homo policies in schools violate the Equal
Protection Clause.21 Lastly, Part V proposes several
possible responses available to mitigate the effect of
No Promo Homo educational policies, and alleviate
their long-lasting and damaging effects on students.22
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II. Background

A. No Promo Homo: Origins
The gay rights movement has been a
catalyst for controversy and social change since its
inception.23 Traditionally, anti-gay arguments have
emerged from religious doctrine, medical opinions,
or social stigmatization.24 More recently however,
a new anti-gay rhetoric has enjoyed tremendous
success.25 These arguments are broadly referred to
as “no promotion of homosexuals” or “no promo
homo.”26 Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., has
written extensively on the topic 27 and describes the
following underlying logic behind No Promo Homo:
if the state adopts a law giving rights to homosexuals
or protecting homosexuality it is thereby promoting
homosexuality.28 It should be the state’s purpose to
promote good conduct and discourage conduct that
is not as good.29 Because homosexuality is not as good
as heterosexuality, laws should not be adopted giving
rights to homosexuals or protecting homosexuality.30
These sorts of arguments and policies are
especially pervasive in education.31 No Promo Homo
educational policies are “local or state educational
policies which restrict or eliminate any school based
instruction or activity that could be interpreted as
positive about homosexuality.”32 These policies may
be worded in a manner so as to prohibit promotion
of homosexuality or go further and ban all discussion
of homosexuality.33 These policies help to further
reinforce many of the myths and misconceptions
about homosexuality that still persist in society at
large.34
Some supporters of these laws argue that
the purpose of not promoting homosexuality is to
protect children who are wavering in their sexual
identity and may be swayed towards homosexuality
if it were to be promoted or discussed in school.35
Proponents maintain that if teachers or schools are
allowed to discuss homosexuality, it will signal to
children that such behavior is acceptable; thereby
serving to “indoctrinate” children into believing
non-heterosexuality is acceptable.36 However,
forcing schools and teachers not to promote, or
even acknowledge, that homosexuality exists as an
alternative ignores the reality of society at large.37
Although many No Promo Homo policies claim to
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be grounded in the idea that children should not be
taught about sex at school,38 sexual identity has become
a major issue, even for younger children.39 Children
may already be aware of their own homosexuality,40
and increasing visibility of openly gay individuals
in the media and within many families ensures
that homosexuality will not merely go away if it is
ignored in schools.41 California seems to be the leader
in understanding the importance of acknowledging
the LGBT community in schools, recently passing
the FAIR Education Act which will require LGBT
inclusive curriculum.42
B. Effects of Stigmatization on LGBT Students
Homosexuality continues to be a divisive
issue in American politics.43 Although approval of
homosexuality by the American public has followed
an upward trend, there remains a very substantial
segment of the public that continues to disapprove
of homosexuality.44 Further, although homosexuality
has been accepted by more Americans as a whole,
many in the LGBT community continue to keep
their sexuality a secret due to fear of retribution and
rejection.45 These fears and continued disapproval
of homosexuality are likely bolstered by what
some commenters have termed “heterosexism” or
“heterocentrism.”46 The terms refer to a system of
bias which regards heterosexuality as the “normative
form of human sexuality and thereby connotes
prejudice against anyone who falls outside of that
form.”47 Although heterosexism is a pervasive part
of virtually every facet of society, schools may play
an exceptionally important part in either continuing
to foster heterosexism or limiting its continued
viability, due to the role of schools as an agent for
socialization.48 A teacher in a school district which
adopted a No Promo Homo policy stated that “[i]f
you can’t talk about it in any context, which is how
teachers interpret district policies, kids internalize
that to mean that being gay must be so shameful
and wrong, and that has created a climate of fear and
repression and harassment.”49 Although researchers
have studied the links between heterosexism in schools
and its effect on students,50 it was not until a rash of
suicides by LGBT students in recent years that the
issue received any significant media attention.51 The
issue has gained such attention that the United States
Department of Education has begun to take a more
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proactive role in ensuring that schools protect LGBT
students to the full extent required by the law.52
A 2009 survey of middle and high school
students found that eighty-four percent of LGBT
youth experienced harassment at school the previous
year.53 LGBT young adults who reported high levels
of bullying during middle and high school are 5.6
times more likely to attempt suicide, and 2.6 times
more likely to have clinical levels of depression.54 A
study of the higher rate of suicides in LGBT youth
identified several related factors such as stigma and
discrimination, especially acts such as rejection or
abuse by peers, bullying, harassment, and denunciation
from religious communities.55 The report also
presented “evidence that discriminatory laws and
public policies have a profound negative impact on
the mental health of gay adults.”56 When questioned
as to their experiences in school, LGBT students in
states with No Promo Homo policies reported much
less support from teachers and administrators as
compared to student support in states without No
Promo Homo policies.57 Additionally, students from
states with No Promo Homo laws were less likely to
report having LGBT-related resources in school, such
as comprehensive school harassment/assault policies,
school personnel supportive of LGBT students, and
Gay-Straight Alliances.58
LGBT youth already face substantial
adversity in schools.59 Denying teachers and school
administrators the ability to present homosexuality
as an acceptable alternative to students only serves
to further exacerbate the problems already faced by
LGBT students.60 The inability to maintain an open
environment for students to explore themselves
and learn about diversity among their peers will
further perpetuate school atmospheres tinged with
homophobia.61
III. State of the Law

A. Current State Laws
States have almost exclusive power to run
their schools, and are thus entitled to almost unfettered
discretion with regard to selection and implementation
of school policies and curriculum.62 Several states
and local districts have implemented some variation
of No Promo Homo policies. Among these are
31

Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.63 Each effectively
mandates that heterosexuality be emphasized as the
only acceptable lifestyle.64 Acknowledgment of the
possibility of a healthy homosexual lifestyle would
violate the policies.65 Generally, the statutes can be
divided into two categories, with the first explicitly
barring positive discussion of homosexuality66 and
the second employing a more subtle approach.67 The
Arizona statute, for example, proscribes instruction
that “promotes” a homosexual life-style, “portrays”
homosexuality as an alternative life-style, or “suggests”
that some methods of homosexual sex are safe.68
Conversely, the South Carolina statute, for example,
mandates that students only receive instruction
regarding homosexuality in the context of sexually
transmitted diseases.69 This prohibition essentially
forecloses any possibility that homosexuality
be portrayed as an acceptable alternative to
heterosexuality. Further, the vast majority of these
policies emphasize that abstinence before marriage is
the only viable option.70 One commentator added:
[A]s ineffective as abstinence-onlyuntil-marriage education is in
protecting adolescents in general,
it is wholly inapplicable to gay and
lesbian adolescents . . . . [S]tudents
are told they must remain abstinent
until they are married. This seems
somewhat cruel, as there is a certain
percentage of these students who
may have no legal opportunity to
engage in marriage: students who
are lesbian or gay. In effect, these
students are being told that they
should never have sex.71
The state policies are as follows:
Alabama: “Any program or curriculum in the public schools in Alabama
that includes sex education or the
human reproductive process shall, as
a minimum, include and emphasize
the following: [a]bstinence from
sexual intercourse outside of lawful marriage is the expected social
standard for unmarried school-age
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persons . . . .Course materials and
instruction that relate to sexual
education or sexually transmitted
diseases should include all of the
following elements: an emphasis, in
a factual manner and from a public
health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the
general public and that homosexual
conduct is a criminal offense under
the laws of the state.”72
a. Arizona: “No district shall include in
its course of study instruction which: 1.
Promotes a homosexual life-style; 2. Portrays
homosexuality as a positive alternative lifestyle; 3. Suggests that some methods of sex
are safe methods of homosexual sex.”73
b. Louisiana: “No sex education course offered
in the public schools of the state shall utilize
any sexually explicit materials depicting
male or female homosexual activity . . .
Emphasize abstinence from sexual activity
outside of marriage as the expected standard
for all school-age children.”74
c. Mississippi: “Abstinence-only education shall
remain the state standard for any sex-related
education taught in the public schools. For
purposes of this section, abstinence-only
education includes any type of instruction
or program which, at an appropriate age
. . . [t]eaches the current state law related
to sexual conduct, including forcible rape,
statutory rape, paternity establishment,
child support and homosexual activity .
. . and teaches that a mutually faithful,
monogamous relationship in the context of
marriage is the only appropriate setting for
sexual intercourse.”75
d. Oklahoma: “AIDS prevention education
shall specifically teach students that:
1. engaging in homosexual activity,
promiscuous sexual activity, intravenous
drug use or contact with contaminated
blood products is now known to be
primarily responsible for contact with
the AIDS virus; 2. avoiding the activities
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specified in paragraph 1 of this subsection is
the only method of preventing the spread of
the virus.”76
e. South Carolina: “The program of instruction
provided for in this section may not include
a discussion of alternative sexual lifestyles
from heterosexual relationships including,
but not limited to, homosexual relationships
except in the context of instruction
concerning sexually transmitted diseases.”77
f.

Texas: “Course materials and instruction
relating to sexual education or sexually
transmitted diseases should include:
emphasis, provided in a factual manner
and from a public health perspective, that
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable
to the general public and that homosexual
conduct is a criminal offense under Section
21.06, Penal Code.”78

g. Utah: “[T]he materials adopted by a local
school board . . . shall be based upon
recommendations of the school district’s
Curriculum Materials Review Committee
that comply with state law and state
board rules emphasizing abstinence before
marriage and fidelity after marriage, and
prohibiting instruction in: the advocacy of
homosexuality. . . the advocacy of sexual
activity outside of marriage.”79
B. Vagueness

One of the striking aspects of some of
the more blatant No Promo Homo policies is
just how vague they really are.80 The Arizona
law states that teachers may not “promote,”
“portray,” or “suggest” certain aspects relating to
the homosexual “life-style.”81 The school staff
charged with abiding by these policies must then
determine exactly what conduct or instruction
would constitute promotion, portrayal, or
suggestion. The term “life-style” is just as
ineffective, in that it has no accepted meaning.82
Thus, the meaning of the term, and by extension
the policy, becomes susceptible to a wide array of
interpretations that can be manipulated in kind
with desired outcomes.83 It may in fact be another
example of the conflation between sexual identity
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and sexual behavior, a distortion that is common
in society and the legal realm.84 Compounding
all of this is the fact that no guidance is normally
provided to help teachers determine acceptable
standards of instruction or responses.85
C. Most Recent Policies
Recently, two policies were thrust into the
media spotlight. The first was a local policy in effect
in Annoka-Hennepin, Minnesota.86 The Sexual
Orientation Curriculum Policy (“SOCP”) stated in
part:
Teaching about sexual orientation is not a
part of the District adopted curriculum; rather, such
matters are best addressed within individual family
homes, churches, or community organizations.
Anoka-Hennepin staff, in the course of their
professional duties, shall remain neutral on matters
regarding sexual orientation including but not limited
to student led discussions.87
The SOCP was predated by an official
memo promulgated by the District which declared
that “homosexuality [is] not to be taught/addressed
as a normal, valid lifestyle.”88 Written guidance from
the Anoka-Hennepin School District made clear
that the term “sexual orientation” in the SOCP was
intended to bar discussion of homosexuality, but
not heterosexuality.89 In a lawsuit on behalf of five
former and current students of the Anoka-Hennepin
School District, the Southern Poverty Law Center
and National Center for Lesbian Rights alleged that
the SOCP violated student rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, Title IX, and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.90 The plaintiffs
pointed to evidence of bullying and harassment that
went unchecked by teachers and administrators,
who were inadequately trained to deal with antigay bullying due to the “neutrality” policy.91 The
plaintiffs alleged that one administrator told parents
that the School District handles issues of racial
harassment differently from harassment based on
sexual orientation.92 Plaintiffs also pointed out that
during the nine month period between November
2009 and July 2010, at least four LGBT or perceived
LGBT students in the Anoka-Hennepin School
District committed suicide.93 After several months,
the School District and the Plaintiffs entered into a
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consent decree.94 Under the decree, the School Board
agreed to implement a program with significant
protections for LGBT students, with the aim of
preventing bullying and creating a more accepting
environment.95 Of particular importance, the School
District specifically agreed to repeal its SOCP, and
made clear that school officials may affirm the selfworth of students, including their status as LGBT.96
Another policy that garnered substantial
attention was Tennessee’s proposed law, dubbed the
“Don’t Say Gay” bill.97 The original bill would have
banned teachers from “provid[ing] any instruction
or material that discusses sexual orientation other
than heterosexuality.”98 The bill was later amended
and would have required curriculum to be “limited
exclusively to age-appropriate natural human
reproduction science.”99 The bill’s Senate sponsor,
Senator Stacey Campfield, made it clear that the
change in the language of the bill was merely a way
to get the bill passed by assuaging fellow Senators
uneasy with viability of the original language.100 He
was confident that the altered language would be just
as effective in barring discussion of homosexuality,
stating, “There’s more than one way to skin a cat.
This skins the cat, but doesn’t scare [other legislators]
so much.”101 The bill’s House sponsor, Representative
Jon Hensley stated, “I have two children — in the
third- and fourth-grade — and [I] don’t want them
to be exposed to things I don’t agree with . . . .”102
The Tennessee Senate approved the bill in late 2011,
but the bill died in May 2012 when the House of
Representatives failed to vote on it before the end of
the legislative session.103
Although it did not garner nearly as much
media attention, legislators in Missouri, taking
the lead from Tennessee, introduced a similar
Don’t Say Gay bill.104 The law would have banned
teachers from talking about any sexuality other
than heterosexuality and would have also banned
any extracurricular activities that would do the
same.105 It stated, “Notwithstanding any other
law to the contrary, no instruction, material, or
extracurricular activity sponsored by a public school
that discusses sexual orientation other than in
scientific instruction concerning human reproduction
shall be provided in any public school.”106
Tennessee and Missouri’s Don’t Say Gay bills illustrate
that No Promo Homo school policies are not just a
vestige of past anti-gay rhetoric, but instead continue
34

to find support from certain sizeable segments of
legislators and citizens alike.
IV. Equal Protection Clause

A. Constitutional Standard
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that “No state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”107 The Equal Protection Clause
gives Congress the power to enforce this right, “but
absent controlling congressional direction, the courts
have themselves devised standards for determining the
validity of state legislation or other official action that
is challenged as denying equal protection.”108 Under
this framework, the basic constitutional question is
whether the challenged government action is justified
by a sufficient purpose.109
When a government action is challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause, three inquiries
should be made: First, what is the classification?
Second, what is the appropriate level of scrutiny?
Third, does the government action meet the level of
scrutiny?110
The Supreme Court of the United States
has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to afford
differing levels of protection to various groups.111
Classifications such as race, alienage, and national
origin are entitled to strict scrutiny.112 Laws found
to be discriminatory against a classification subject
to strict scrutiny will be “sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”113
Strict scrutiny is usually fatal to the challenged law
because the government must have a truly significant
reason for the discrimination.114 Classifications such
as gender and illegitimacy are entitled to intermediate
scrutiny.115 Intermediate scrutiny will result in the law
being upheld if the government can establish that the
discrimination is substantially related to an important
government purpose.116
All other classifications, including sexual
orientation, are reviewed based on a rational basis
standard.117 A classification “must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.”118 This imposes on a
plaintiff the burden of refuting any and all possible
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justifications for the challenged law.119 As a result,
rational basis review is a very difficult standard for
a challenger to meet. This is especially evident when
looking at the outcomes of equal protection clause
claims; between 1973 and 1996, the United States
Supreme Court upheld over a hundred classifications
on rational review basis, while invalidating less than a
dozen classifications under this review.120
It is undeniable that the level of scrutiny a
group is entitled to will be extremely influential in
the outcome of any particular legal classification.121
Although the factors involved in determining the
level of scrutiny a classification is entitled to have not
been clearly established, some general patterns have
emerged.122 Thus, a court will likely consider whether
the involved group is a “discrete and insular” minority,
whether the group is defined by an immutable
characteristic, whether the group has been subjected
to a history of discrimination, whether the group is
“politically powerless,” and whether the government
classification is related to the group’s functioning in
society.123 Groups who meet these criteria may then
be entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect classification.124
It has been the aim of many minority groups
who are only entitled to rational review to attempt
to convince the court to afford their classification an
upgrade to require heightened scrutiny via a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification.125 However, these
classifications have remained relatively unaltered
over time, and are likely to remain so, due to the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to acknowledge new
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications even where
the group appears to have fulfilled the factors that
would ostensibly entitle them to such treatment.126
Additionally, the Court has been reluctant to
recognize new fundamental Constitutional rights,
which would likely lead to a blitz of challenges to
state and local laws.127 Recent cases, however, indicate
that the rational basis review has been given “a bite”
resulting in a sort of quasi-heightened scrutiny for
classifications such as sexual orientation.128 Thus, it
is my contention that this shift in analysis, if applied
to No Promo Homo laws in schools, would be
more likely to result in a finding that these laws are
unconstitutional.129

SPRING 2013

B. Rational Review With a Bite
Much has been said about the consistency
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions regarding
rational review in the context of the Equal Protection
Clause.130 The standard two-step test requires that:
1) the legislature pursue a legitimate goal; and 2) the
means chosen to attain that goal are not arbitrary
or irrational.131 Thus, if a court finds any plausible
government interests and can conceive of reasons
to support the government’s methods for achieving
those interests, the law will survive Constitutional
scrutiny.132
While this test is fairly straightforward, the
rational review standard has become increasingly
difficult for the Court to implement in a consistent
manner.133 Under what has been termed “second
order” rational review or “rational review with a
bite,” the Court does not defer to the judgment of
the legislature, but instead conducts an “inquiry into
whether given the benefits of the statute, the statute
reflects a rational accommodation of interests.”134
In implementing a more equitable, balancing-type
approach, the Court is effectively eschewing the
dictates of rational review, and instead, applying
some formulation of the more stringent heightened
review. In his concurring opinion in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Justice Marshall chastised
the majority’s reasoning, stating:
[T]he Court’s heightened-scrutiny
discussion is even more puzzling
given that Cleburne’s ordinance is
invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing
inquiry associated with heightened
scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does
not label its handiwork heightened
scrutiny, and perhaps the method
employed must hereafter be called
“second order” rational-basis review
rather than “heightened scrutiny.”
But however labeled, the rational
basis test invoked today is most
assuredly not the rational-basis test
of [precedent].135
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Almost two decades later, in another
concurring opinion, Justice O’Conner seemed to
echo Justice Marshall’s observations, albeit in a
more approving manner. In Lawrence v. Texas,136 the
Court declared a Texas statute criminalizing samesex sodomy was unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause.137 While the majority refused to strike
down the law based on the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court acknowledged that it was a “tenable”
argument.138 In her concurring opinion, Justice
O’Connor argued that “[w]hen a law exhibits such
a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, [the
Court has] applied a more searching form of rational
basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal
Protection Clause.”139 Although the Lawrence statute
was invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
Court’s reasoning echoes the reasoning found in
several critical “rational review with a bite” cases.140
Three cases, discussed in detail below, are especially
poignant in the analysis of modern Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence under rational review: United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, Cleburn v.
Cleburn Living Center, and Romer v. Evans.141
1. United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno
Moreno involved an Equal Protection Clause
challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act of
1964, which excluded distribution of food stamps to
any household containing an unrelated individual.142
A class of plaintiffs barred from receiving benefits
because of their household make-up filed suit,
alleging the requirement was discriminatory and
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.143 Because
the plaintiffs were not one of the classifications
entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court evaluated
the challenged law under rational basis review.144
Of particular importance in the case was the
legislative history of the Food Stamp Act of 1964.145
A House report indicated that the intent behind
the relation requirement was to prevent “hippies”
and “hippie communes” from receiving benefits.146
The Court rejected the government’s argument that
the exclusionary classification was an effort to curb
fraud, instead finding that the classification did not
bear enough relation with the stated intent for the
reasoning to be credible.147 The Court held that absent
any other justification, the Food Stamp Act’s relation
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requirement could not be upheld based on this
purpose.148 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
declared that “if the constitutional conception of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”149
Moreno establishes that while rational review is a very
relaxed standard, there are some instances where there
is really no rational basis for the government action.150
2. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Cleburne involved a city ordinance requiring a
special use permit for the construction of hospitals for
the insane, feeble-minded, alcoholics or drug addicts,
or penal or correctional institutions.151 The Cleburne
Living Center sought a permit to build a home for the
mentally retarded.152 When the city council denied
the permit, the Cleburne Living Center filed suit,
challenging the validity of the ordinance, and arguing
that it discriminated against the mentally retarded and
violated the Equal Protection Clause.153 The district
court found that mental retardation was neither a
suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class, and was instead
subject to rational review.154 Applying rational review,
the district court found that the ordinance was
rationally related to the city’s legitimate interests in
protecting the community and the mentally retarded
and thus found the ordinance to be constitutional.155
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification
and thus subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.156
The Supreme Court of the United States
held that mental retardation was only entitled to
rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny.157 The
Court was hesitant to set out a standard that would
expand the classifications entitled to strict scrutiny,
due to the difficulty that could arise in where to
draw to the line.158 Even subject to only rational
review, the Supreme Court was unwilling to accept
the City’s reasoning for the law.159 The Court found
that the city’s reasoning was based on “mere negative
attitudes or fear” which was not a rational basis
for the legislative action.160 The Court found that
where the permit requirement rested on “irrational
prejudice,” the ordinance was plainly contrary to the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.161
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3. Romer v. Evans
In 1992, Colorado voters approved
Amendment 2, a constitutional provision prohibiting
any state action designed to protect homosexuals
from discrimination.162 A suit was filed by several
government employees and private citizens
challenging the amendment on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause.163 The district court ruled that the
amendment was subject to strict scrutiny because of
its infringement on the rights of gays and lesbians
from participating in the political process.164 The state
attempted to make the argument that Amendment 2
was designed to serve compelling interests; however,
the court was not persuaded.165 The Supreme Court
of Colorado affirmed the ruling and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.166
In its ruling striking the amendment,
the Court rejected Colorado’s argument that by
prohibiting protections for gays and lesbians, the
State was merely ensuring that everyone was placed
on equal ground.167 Emphasizing the fact that the law
specifically singled out only homosexuals, and had an
extensive effect upon the legal rights of homosexuals,
the Court found that even if the amendment was only
subject to rational review, the law was still violative
of even this lenient standard.168 Amendment 2 was
found to be unconstitutional because it “imposed
a ‘broad and undifferentiated disability’ on a single
group and harbored ‘animus’ toward a class of
people.”169 The Romer Court’s finding of a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause even under rational
review was a significant development in Equal
Protection jurisprudence.170

C. Rational Review With A Bite as Applied to No
Promo Homo Laws
In determining the level of scrutiny afforded
to various classifications, the Court has pointed to
several important considerations, such as whether the
group is a discrete and insular minority, whether the
group is defined by an immutable characteristic, and
whether the group has been subjected to a history of
discrimination.171 Although LGBT people are likely
to fulfill most of these factors, it is unlikely that
LGBT people will be afforded strict scrutiny, due
to a general reluctance to accept new strict scrutiny
classifications.172 However, because the Supreme
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Court has effectively closed off this avenue, the Court
seems more willing to afford classifications entitled
to rational review a more probing analysis.173 This
rational review with a bite standard would likely be
the standard applied to No Homo Promo policies
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.174
Rational review with a bite cases such as
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer established that even
where the Court ostensibly defers to the judgment
of the government, not every justification will be
sufficient.175 In each case, the Court found evidence
of some ulterior basis for the classification, essentially
some sort of bias or animus against the group.
In the case of Tennessee’s proposed “Don’t
Say Gay Bill,” the words of one of the bill’s sponsors,
Senator Stacey Campfield, were especially telling.
In a radio interview discussing his proposed bill,
responding to a question concerning the prevalence
of bullying of LGBT students in schools, he stated
“[t]he bullying thing is the biggest lark out there.”176
Regarding homosexuality, he stated, “[i]t happens
in nature, but so does bestiality, that does not make
it right or something we should be teaching in
school.”177 Further he asserted that “it is virtually,
not completely, but virtually, impossible to contract
AIDS through heterosexual sex . . . very rarely
[transmitted].”178 As the sponsor of law which was
supposedly intended to protect children from the
dangers of sexual activity and sexually transmitted
diseases, Senator Campfield’s statements are not only
false, they are downright dangerous.179
With regard to No Promo Homo policies
in general, it will be difficult for the government
to provide any justification beyond that of moral
opposition to homosexuality. Even though some
of the policies are proffered in the context of sex
education or AIDS education, the central policies do
not seem to have an interest in actually preventing
the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.180 It
is completely implausible to assert that no method of
homosexual sex is safe. If the state was truly interested
in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, as would be the likely justification for the law
should it be challenged, they might actually provide
instruction on methods of safe homosexual sex, just as
they would do for heterosexual sex. Furthermore, the
language of the policies evidences an animus against
LGBT people.181 These laws make it clear that the aim
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of the policy is to deter homosexuality by stigmatizing
and demeaning it. It is striking that the policies require
that teachers emphasize that homosexual conduct is a
criminal offense,182 in spite of the fact that the United
States Supreme Court struck down Texas’s own law
banning same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.183 As
a result, these policies violate the Equal Protection
Clause because they do not have any viable rational
justifications as written.
V. Challenging No Promo Homo
The aim of those fighting to eliminate No
Promo Homo policies in schools is not to recruit
young children into a homosexual “lifestyle,” as some
have argued.184 Instead, the aim is to remove just one of
the many legal and social barriers to equality. Because
the school plays such an influential role in children’s
lives, No Promo Homo policies can be especially
destructive to children who identify or are perceived
as LGBT.185 The recent media attention on two No
Promo Homo policies indicates the time is ripe to
bring further challenges to the laws.186 The AnnokaHennepin School District lawsuit and subsequent
settlement, which agreed to repeal its policy regarding
LGBT students, and allow for the affirmation of
students’ LGBT status, could be instrumental in
spurring similar challenges to other No Promo Homo
policies around the United States, or even encourage
some states or districts to reconsider and repeal their
No Promo Homo policies.187 The threat of possible
negative media attention and litigation costs involved
in defending such a policy might also help to prevent
No Promo Homo policies from being adopted by
other schools and legislators. It is also important
to note that some of the statewide No Promo
Homo policies have been challenged by subsequent
legislators.188 Media coverage of these efforts could
help increase support for these repeal measures.
In addition, another promising response to
local and state level No Promo Homo educational
policies is federal intervention. Although, education
has traditionally been within the purview of state
and local government,189 recent federal legislation,
such as the No Child Left Behind Act and the Race
to the Top Fund, indicates a possible trend towards
standardization of educational programs across
the United States.190 Continued pressure from the
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Department of Education could help lead to a change
in policy. Alternatively, the Department could issue
guidance on the topic of how teachers can abide by
these policies while still ensuring the safety and wellbeing of students.
Moreover, the Department of Education
can continue to lobby for federal anti-bullying
legislation that specifically covers sexual orientation
and gender identity. Two such bills, The Student
Non-Discrimination Act and the Safe Schools
Improvement Act, have been introduced and met
with approval from LGBT activists and educators.191
Although similar legislation192 has failed in the past,
the hope is that eventually there will be enough
political support to have such a law passed. These
protections would send the signal that even if No
Promo Homo laws remain on the books, this will not
excuse ignoring the destructive results they may have
on students. This would also force school officials to
evaluate their programs to ensure compliance with the
law. Ultimately the best anti-bullying policies prevent
bullying rather than punish it severely after the fact.193
VI. Conclusion
No Promo Homo policies continue to enjoy
prevalence in classrooms around the country.194
Those who support these policies applaud them for
presumably protecting children from homosexuality.
Those who oppose the policies argue that these
laws unfairly target a vulnerable group, and that
children should be entitled to accurate information.
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that battles over what
students are exposed to in the classroom, especially
with regard to homosexuality, engender strong
opinions on both sides of the aisle. Complicating
the issue, or perhaps resulting from it, the incidence
of bullying and stigmatization of students who are
LGBT or are perceived to be LGBT demonstrates
the urgency required in dealing with this issue.195 The
failure of schools to address or support students who
are LGBT or may come from an LGBT family likely
contributes to the stigmatization of those students.
Ultimately, however, those states and local
governments who continue to enforce curricular
requirements banning the discussion or promotion
of homosexuality, are likely violating the rights of
students themselves. These policies stigmatize one
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class of people, based on nothing more than political
and social animus against them.196 Although sexual
orientation has not been acknowledged as a strict
scrutiny classification under the relevant Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, it appears that
sexual orientation fits squarely within the enumerated
requirements for strict scrutiny, and should be classified
as such.197 However, even if the Court continues
its reluctance to grant strict scrutiny review to new
classifications, it would appear that No Promo Homo
policies still violate the Equal Protection Clause, even
when only entitled to rational basis review. Although
rational basis review is a very deferential standard,
the Supreme Court has shown that although it may
be applying rational review, there does seem to be a
willingness to give it a bite, thus requiring a more
compelling reason for the classification.198
There is no doubt that challenging these
policies in court will likely prove a long and difficult
process, but taking into account the immense impact
they have on students, it is an important cause. In
addition to courtroom challenges, educators, parents
and legislators should work together to come up
with a solution that would be both appropriate for
school children but also present a fair portrayal of
homosexuality, so as to protect vulnerable children.199
Ultimately, those who support these policies, and
those who are fighting to change them, have the same
goal in mind. Indisputably, the goal is to protect our
children. The only question is whether both groups
will be able to put aside their ideological differences
in order to prevent further damage to children across
the country.
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